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THE NOMINEE IS ... ARTICLE V 
Stephen M. Griffin* 
In any list of least favorite constitutional provisions, we 
should not ignore the provisions protecting slavery, such as Arti-
cle I § 9 cl. 1 (providing that the slave trade could not be prohib-
ited prior to 1808) and Article IV § 2 cl. 3 (the fugitive slave 
clause). These provisions may have been superseded, but they 
have not been expunged from the text and they should not be 
forgotten. 
That said, there are a number of constitutional provisions 
that have always struck me as questionable. Article I § 4 leaves 
the procedures for holding federal elections in the hands of the 
states.l This has meant that there has never been a uniform law 
of voter registration (contributing to election fraud and lower 
turnout in the twentieth century) or a uniform federal ballot 
(leading to voter confusion in some states). The method of presi-
dential election specified in Article II § 1 was an unstable com-
promise, resulting in the need for the 1\velfth Amendment only 
fourteen years after the Constitution was ratified. It would also 
have been better had the Framers tried to define at least a mini-
mal conception of the "judicial power" in Article III § 1 (or, for 
that matter, the "executive power" in Article II § 1). 
My nominee, however, is Article V, which has historically 
operated to make the Constitution very difficult to amend.z It is 
true that the question of how to provide for change poses diffi-
cult choices for those who create a constitution. If the constitu-
tion makes change too easy, there is a risk that the constitution 
will not structure politics, but will be hostage to it. But making 
change too difficult may cause political instability or force change 
to occur through a non-constitutional process. The procedure for 
change that the Framers provided in Article V appears to reflect 
a judgment that making change too easy is the greater danger. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Thlane University. 
1. See the contribution of Jeffrey Rosen to this symposium. 
2. On matters of amendment and much more, see Sanford Levinson, ed., Respond-
ing to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton U. 
Press, 1995). 
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The Framers were successful in making formal constitutional 
change very difficult. Since 1791, the Constitution has been 
amended only sixteen times (or seventeen, depending on your 
view of the validity of the 1\venty-Seventh Amendment). The 
provisions of Article V have undoubtedly played a role in caus-
ing this low rate of amendment. The second round of approval 
by a supermajority of state legislatures or conventions seems es-
pecially daunting. By requiring the concurrence of both national 
and state legislatures, Article V comes close to requiring unanim-
ity to approve any amendment as a practical matter. 
An important study by Donald Lutz confirms what many 
commentators have long suspected-that the U.S. Constitution is 
one of the most difficult constitutions in the world to change.3 
This creates a serious problem for American constitutionalism. 
Since the Framers chose to err on the side of making amendment 
difficult, they ran the risk that Article V might make the Consti-
tution irrelevant as circumstances changed. Most commentators 
would concede that the Constitution has changed a great deal 
through non-Article V means, primarily judicial interpretation. 
It must also be stressed, however, that the Constitution has 
changed through ordinary political means, that is, without formal 
amendment or a Supreme Court decision. The development of 
political parties in the nineteenth century and the establishment 
of independent regulatory agencies and a different conception of 
the presidency in the twentieth century are familiar examples of 
this kind of change. 
By making it difficult to change the Constitution, the Fram-
ers forced a significant amount of constitutional change off the 
books and thus limited the ability of the Constitution to structure 
political outcomes. To the extent that we believe that constitu-
tionalism should play this role, we should favor making change 
through Article V easier. It is not clear that there is a real need, 
for example, for the supermajority requirement for approval by 
state legislatures or conventions. If the concurrence of only a 
majority of states were required, some of the amendments ap-
proved by Congress but never ratified by the required 
supermajority would have become part of the Constitution. It 
appears that this includes the 1789 Reapportionment amend-
ment, the 1810 Titles of Nobility amendment, the 1924 Child La-
3. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 355, 362 (1994), in Levinson, Responding to Imperfection at 237-74 (cited in note 
2). 
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bor amendment, and the 1972 Equal Rights amendment.4 I am 
sure that different scholars would have different opinions as to 
whether these amendments were desirable. I confine myself to 
two observations: that approval of the Child Labor amendment 
might have given additional constitutional legitimacy to the New 
Deal and that we would be better off with the ERA. 
The crucial point, however, is that making amendment eas-
ier would have the effect of encouraging additional amendments 
to keep the Constitution up to date. Perhaps a supermajority of 
Congress should be sufficient to approve any amendment. While 
the contrary view that amending the Constitution must be done 
with caution is understandable, this view is in some tension with 
the goals of American constitutionalism. Making amendment 
difficult does not avoid constitutional change, it simply encour-
ages change to occur through other means. If we value delibera-
tive change, we should favor making constitutional amendment 
less difficult. 
A final questionable aspect of Article V is the provision 
"that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
suffrage in the Senate." For practical purposes, this makes it im-
possible to change representation in the Senate to a population 
basis. The power the present system of representation gives to 
states with small populations increasingly appears to be an 
anachronism. 
4. Here I rely on the very useful study by Richard Bernstein. See Richard B. Bern-
stein with Jerome Agel, Amending America: If We Love the Constitution So Much, Why 
Do We Keep Trying to Change It? 45-46, 140-43, 1n-81, 301-03 (Times Books, 1993). 
